We introduce and study the Generalized Cops and Robbers game (GCR), an N -player pursuit game in graphs. The two-player version is essentially equivalent to the classic Cops and Robbers (CR) game. The three-player version can be understood as two CR games played simultaneously on the same graph; a player can be at the same time both pursuer and evader. The same is true for four or more players. We formulate GCR as a discounted stochastic game of perfect information and prove that, for three or more players, it has at least two Nash Equilibria: one in positional deterministic strategies and another in non-positional ones. We also study the capturing properties of GCR Nash Equilibria in connection to the cop-number of a graph. Finally, we briefly discuss GCR as a member of a wider family of multi-player graph pursuit games with rather interesting properties.
Introduction
We introduce and study Generalized Cops and Robbers (GCR); it is a multi-player pursuit game closely related to the classic two-player Cops and Robbers (CR) game [14, 16] .
GCR is played on a finite, simple, undirected graph G by N players P 1 , P 2 , ..., P N (with N ≥ 2). The players start at given vertices of the graph and at each turn one player moves to a vertex in the closed neighborhood of his current position; the other players stay at their current vertices. The game effectively terminates when, for some n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}, P n captures P n+1 , i.e., when they are located in the same vertex; if no capture ever takes place, the game continues ad infinitum.
Let us denote the GCR game with N players by Γ N . Then Γ 2 is very similar to the classic CR game, where P 1 (the "cop") tries to capture P 2 (the "robber"). In Γ 3 , P 1 tries to capture P 2 who tries to evade P 1 and capture P 3 ; P 1 can never be captured and P 3 can never capture. Hence Γ 3 can be understood as two CR games played simultaneously on the same graph; a player is both pursuer and evader at the same time. The situation is extended similarly for higher N values.
As we will show, Γ 2 can be formulated as a zero-sum stochastic game which has a value (and both players have optimal strategies). On the other hand, for N ≥ 3, Γ N is a non-zero sum game and the main question is the existence of Nash Equilibria (NE). As we will show, more than one such equilibria always exist and they sometimes lead to surprising player behavior. In this sense, GCR presents novel and (we hope) mathematically interesting problems.
There is a rich literature on pursuit games in graphs, Euclidean spaces and other more general structures but it is generally confined to two-player games.
The seminal works on pursuit games in graphs are [14, 16] in which the classic CR game was introduced. A great number of variations of the classic game have been studied; an extensive and recent review of the related literature appears in the book [1] . However, practically all of this literature concerns two-player games. Classic CR and its variants may involve more than one cops, but all of them are tokens controlled by a single cop player. A very interesting paper [2] deals with "generalized cops and robber games" but again the scope is restricted to two-player games. In fact, the only previous work (of which we are aware) dealing with multi-player games of pursuit in graphs is our own [12] . It is also remarkable that, while classic CR and many of its variants admit a natural game theoretic formulation and study, this has not been exploited in the CR literature.
Regarding pursuit in Euclidean spaces, the predominant approach is in terms of differential games as introduced in the seminal book [10] . There is a flourishing literature on the subject, which contains many works involving multiple pursuers, but they are generally assumed to be collaborating [5, 11, 15, 18, 19] . The case of antagonistic pursuers has been studied in some papers [8, 9] but the methods used in these works do not appear to be easily applicable to the study of pursuit / evasion on graphs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is preliminary: we introduce notation, define states, histories and strategies and give a general form of the payoff function. In Section 3 we prove that, for any graph and any number of players, GCR has a NE in deterministic positional strategies; this result is applicable not only to GCR but to a wider family of pursuit games, as will be discussed later. In Section 4 we show that in the two-player GCR game: (i) the value of the game exists (essentially it is the logarithm of the optimal capture time) and (ii) both players have optimal deterministic positional strategies. Because of the close connection of GCR to the classical CR game, these results also hold for CR; while they have been previously established by graph theoretic methods, we believe our proof is the first game-theoretic one. In Section 5 we study the three-player GCR game and prove: (i) the existence of a NE in deterministic positional strategies; (ii) the existence of an additional NE in deterministic but non-positional strategies; (iii) various results connecting the classic cop number of a graph to capturability. In Section 6 we briefly discuss N -players GCR when N ≥ 4. In Section 7 we show that the ideas behind GCR can be generalized to obtain a large family of multi-player pursuit games on graphs. Finally, in Section 8 we summarize, present our conclusions and discuss future research directions.
Preliminaries
The following notations will be used throughout the paper.
Given a graph
is the closed neighborhood of x:
2. The cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|; the set of elements of A which are not elements of B is denoted by A\B.
3. N is the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...} and N 0 is {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. For any M ∈ N we define [M ] = {1, 2, ..., M }.
4.
The graph distance (length of shortest path in G) between x, y ∈ V is denoted by d G (x, y) or simply by d (x, y).
In Section 1 we have described GCR informally; now we define the elements of the game rigorously.
The game proceeds at discrete turns (time steps) and at every turn all players except one must remain at their locations. In other words, at every turn t ∈ N, for every player except one, the action set (see (2.1) below) is a singleton. This, in addition to the fact that all players are aware of all previously executed moves, means that GCR is a perfect information game.
Any player P n can have the first move, but afterwards they move in the sequence implied by their numbering:
When a player has the move, he can either move to a vertex adjacent to his current one or stay in place. Hence the game position or game state has the form s = x 1 , x 2 , ..., x N , p where x n ∈ V is the position (vertex) of the n-th player and p ∈ [N ] is the number of the player who has the next move. The set of nonterminal states is
We introduce an additional terminal state s. Hence the full state set is
We define S n to be the set of states in which P n has the next move:
Hence the set of nonterminal states can be partitioned as follows:
For any n ∈ [N − 1], we say that P n captures P n+1 iff they are located in the same vertex; the set of P n -capture states, i.e., those in which P n captures P n+1 is S n :
Hence nonterminal states can be partitioned into two sets:
capture states:
As already mentioned, when P n has the move, he can move to any vertex in the closed neighborhood of x n ; when another player has the move, P n can only stay in place; when the game is in a capture state or in the terminal state, every player has only the "null move" λ. Formally, when the game state is s, the n-th player's action set is denoted by A n (s) and defined by
The players' actions (i.e., moves) effect state-to-state transitions in the obvious manner. Suppose the game is at position s ∈ S n and P n makes the move a n ∈ A n (s); then T (s, a n ) denotes the resulting game position. A capture state always transits to s and s always transits to itself:
We define the capture time to be
If no capture takes place, the capture time is T C = ∞. Hence the game can evolve as follows.
1. If T C = 0 then the initial state s 0 is a capture state and s t = s for every t ∈ N = {1, 2, ...}.
(a) at the 0-th turn the game starts at some preassigned state s 0 ∈ S N C ;
(b) at the t-th turn (for 0 < t < T C ), the game moves to some state s t ∈ S N C ;
(c) at the T C -th turn the game moves to some capture state s TC ∈ S C and (d) at t = T C + 1 the game moves to the terminal state and stays there: for every t > T C , s t = s.
3. Finally, if T C = ∞ then s t ∈ S N C for every t ∈ N 0 = {0, 1, 2, ...}.
According to the above, the game starts at some preassigned state s 0 = x .. . In other words, we assume each play of the game lasts an infinite number of turns; however, if T C < ∞ then s t = s for every t > T C ; hence, while the game lasts an infinite number of turns, it effectively ends at T C . We define the following history sets. A deterministic strategy is a function σ n which assigns a move to each finite-length history:
At the start of the game P n selects a σ n which determines all his subsequent moves. We will only consider legal 1 deterministic strategies 2 . A strategy profile is a tuple σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N , which specifies one strategy for each player. We are particularly interested in positional strategies, i.e., σ n such that the next move depends only on the current state of the game (but not on previous states or current time):
We define
To complete the description of GCR we must specify the players' payoff functions; we will do this in several steps. In this section we give a general form of the payoff function, which applies not only to GCR, but to a broader family of N -player games (with N ≥ 2). In the next section we will prove that any game of this family admits at least one NE in positional deterministic strategies. In subsequent sections we will treat separately the cases of GCR with N = 2, N = 3 and N ≥ 4 players; in each case, by completely specifying the payoff function, we will reach additional conclusions regarding the properties of the respective game.
For the time being we only specify that the total payoff function of the n-th player (n ∈ [N ]) has the form
where: q n is the turn payoff (it depends on s t , the game state at time t) which is assumed to be bounded:
and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Since the total payoff is the sum of the discounted turn payoffs, GCR is a multi-player discounted stochastic game [6] . Recall that a stochastic game is one which consists of a sequence of one-shot games, each of which depends on the previous game played and the actions of the players. In GCR the players can limit themselves to deterministic strategies; since the state transitions are also deterministic, while GCR is a "stochastic game" in the above sense, in all cases of interest it will actually evolve in a deterministic manner.
We will denote by Γ N (G|s 0 ) the GCR game played by N players on graph G, starting from state s 0 . Our results hold for any γ ∈ (0, 1) so, for simplicity of notation, we omit the γ dependence. In addition, γ will be omitted from statements of theorem, lemmas etc. in the rest if the paper, since all the results presented hold for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
Nash Equilibria for Perfect Information Discounted Games
The following theorem shows that every Γ N (G|s 0 ) has a Nash Equilibrium in deterministic positional strategies. 
For every s and n, let u n (s) = Q n (s, σ). Then the following equations are satisfied ∀n, ∀s ∈ S n : σ n (s) = arg max
Proof. Fink has proved in [7] that every N -player discounted stochastic game has a positional NE in probabilistic strategies; this result holds for the general game (i.e., with concurrent moves and probabilistic strategies and state transitions). According to [7] , at equilibrium the following equations must be satisfied for all m and s:
...
4) where we have modified Fink's original notation to fit our own; in particular:
is the probability that, given the current game state is s, the m-th player plays action a m ;
is the vector of all such probabilities (one probability per available action);
is the probability that, given the current state is s and the player actions are a 1 , a 2 , ..., a N , the next state is s ′ .
Now choose any n and any s ∈ S n . For all m = n, the m-th player has a single move, i.e., we have A m (s) = {a m }, and so p m am (s) = 1. Also, since transitions are deterministic,
Hence, for m = n, (3.4) becomes
Furthermore let us define σ n (s) (for the specific s and n) by
If (3.5) is satisfied by more than one a n , we set σ n (s) to one of these arbitrarily. Then, to maximize the sum in (3.5) the n-th player can set p n σ n (s) (s) = 1 and p n a (s) = 0 for all a = σ n (s). Since this is true for all states and all players (i.e., every player can, without loss, use deterministic strategies) we also have u n (s) = u n (s). Hence (3.5) becomes u n (s) = max
For m = n, the m-th player has no choice of action and (3.5) becomes
We recognize that (3.6)-(3.8) are (3.2)-(3.3). Also, (3.6) defines σ n (s) for every n and s and so we have obtained the required deterministic positional strategies σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 . Note that the initial state s 0 plays no special role in the system (3.2)-(3.3). In other words, using the notation u (s) = u 1 (s) , u 2 (s) , ..., u N (s) and u = (u (s)) s∈S , we see that u and σ are the same for every starting position s 0 and every game Γ N (G|s 0 ) (when N, G and γ are fixed).
Fink's proof requires that, for every n, the total payoff is Q n (s 0 , σ) = ∞ t=0 γ t q n (s t ); but does not place any restrictions (except boundedness) on q n . The same is true of our proof; hence Theorem 3.1 applies not only to the GCR game, for which the form of q n will be specified in Sections 4, 5 and 6, but to a wider family of games, which will be discussed in Section 7.
GCR with Two Players and (Classic CR)
We now proceed to a more detailed study of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ). To this end, we first specify the form of the turn payoff functions q 1 and q 2 :
Recalling that T C is the capture time (and letting γ ∞ = 0), for every s 0 and deterministic σ which result in capture at time T C , we clearly have:
So Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is a zero-sum game. Furthermore, since log Q 1 (s 0 , σ) = T C log γ and log γ < 0, it follows that P 1 (resp. P 2 ) will maximize his payoff by minimizing (resp. maximizing) capture time T c . Hence we have the following simple description: Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is a two-player game in which, starting from an initial position s 0 = x 1 , x 2 , p , P 1 attempts to capture P 2 in the shortest possible time and P 2 attempts to delay capture as long as possible. This is true whenever both players use deterministic strategies, which they can do without loss since Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is a perfect information game. In particular, according to Theorem 3.1, this holds when they play optimally. In fact, according to Theorem 3.1 (for every G and s 0 ) Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) has a NE σ = σ 1 , σ 2 in deterministic positional strategies. And, since Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is a zero-sum game, it follows that σ 1 , σ 2 are optimal and yield the value of the game. More precisely, we have the following. Theorem 4.1 For every graph G and every initial state s 0 ∈ S, the profile of deterministic positional strategies σ = σ 1 , σ 2 specified by Theorem 3.1 satisfies
Furthermore, σ 1 , σ 2 and Q n s 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 can be computed by a value iteration algorithm [17] . Hence Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is completely solved.
Let us now discuss the connection of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) to the classic CR game. Note that the above description of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is almost identical to that of the time optimal version of the classic CR game (e.g., see [1, Section 8.6] ). We only have the following differences.
1. In Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) time is measured in turns; in classic CR it is measured in rounds, where each round consists of one P 1 turn and one P 2 turn.
2. In Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) the starting position s 0 is given; in classic CR it is chosen by the players, in an initial "placement " round. In other words, classic CR starts with an "empty" graph; in the first turn of the 0-th round P 1 chooses his initial position; in the second turn P 2 , having observed P 1 's placement chooses his initial position (after placement, classic CR is played exactly as Γ 2 (G|s 0 )).
At any rate, the important points are the following.
1. Having computed the values u (s 0 ) of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) for every s 0 ∈ S, we can easily obtain the optimal capture time T C of the classic CR game 3 as follows:
are optimal initial placements for P 1 and P 2 ; and the optimal policies of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) are time optimal policies (after placement) of the classic CR.
2. In the classic CR literature, a graph G is called cop-win iff a single cop can capture the robber when both cop and robber play optimally on G. In the more general case, where the cop player controls one or more cop tokens, the cop number of G is denoted by c (G) and defined to be the smallest number of cop tokens which guarantees capture when CR is played optimally on G. Clearly a graph is cop-win iff c (G) = 1. It is easily seen that we can check whether G is cop-win by solving Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) (for all s 0 ) as indicated by the following equivalence:
While the above questions regarding classic CR have been studied in the related literature and answered using graph theoretic methods, the connection to Game Theory appears to not have been previously exploited.
GCR with Three Players
By substituting N = 3 in the definitions of Section 2 we obtain the game Γ 3 (G|s 0 ); in particular we get the sets of capture states
and we use these to define the turn payoffs q n as follows
(5.1) Note that, according to previous remarks, P 2 (resp. P 3 ) is rewarded (resp. penalized) when P 2 captures P 3 and is not simultaneously captured by P 1 . Also, recall that the total payoff function is, as usual,
We are now ready to study Γ 3 (G|s 0 ).
Nash Equilibria: Positional and Non-Positional
By Theorem 3.1 we know that Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has, for every G and s 0 , a NE in deterministic positional strategies. In addition, as we will now show, Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has at least one NE in non-positional deterministic strategies. To this end we will introduce a family of auxiliary games and threat strategies [3, 4, 20] . For every n ∈ [3] we define the game Γ n 3 (G|s 0 ) played on G (and starting at s 0 ) by P n against a player P −n who controls the remaining two entities. For example, in Γ 1 3 (G|s 0 ), P 1 plays against P −1 who controls P 2 and P 3 . The Γ n 3 (G|s 0 ) elements (e.g., movement sequence, states, action sets, capturing conditions etc.) are the same as in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ). P n uses a strategy σ n and P −n uses a strategy profile σ −n ; these form a strategy profile σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 (which can also be used in Γ 3 (G|s 0 )). The payoffs to P n and P −n in Γ n 3 (G|s 0 ) are
Since the capture rules of Γ n 3 (G|s 0 ) are those of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ), P −n can use one of his tokens to capture the other. For instance, in Γ 1 3 (G|s 0 ), P −1 can use P 2 to capture P 3 (as will be seen in a later example, in certain cases this can be an optimal move). Note however that in this case P 1 receives zero payoff (since he did not capture) and P −1 also receives zero payoff (since, by construction, Γ Furthermore, the value and optimal strategies can be computed by Shapley's value-iteration algorithm [17] . Let us denote by φ n n (resp. φ −n n ) the optimal strategy of P n (resp. P −n ) in Γ
We return to Γ 3 (G|s 0 ), and for each P n we introduce the threat strategy π n defined as follows:
1. as long as every player P m (with m = n) follows φ m m , P n follows φ n n ;
2. as soon as some player P m (with m = n) deviates from φ m m , P n switches to φ n m and uses it for the rest of the game 4 .
Note that the π n strategies are not positional. In particular, the action of a player at time t may be influenced by the action (deviation) performed by another player at time t − 2. However, as we will now prove,
is a (non-positional) NE in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ).
Theorem 5.2
For every G, s 0 and γ, we have:
Proof. We choose some initial state s 0 and fix it for the rest of the proof. Now let us prove (5.2) for the case n = 1. In other words, we will show that
We take any π 1 and let the history produced by ( π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ) be s = s 0 s 1 s 2 ..., the history produced by (
(where s 0 = s 0 = s 0 ). We define T 1 as the earliest time in which π 1 and π 1 produce different states:
If T 1 < ∞, on the other hand, then s t = s t for every t < T 1 and we have
We define s * = s T1−1 = s T1−1 and proceed to compare the sums in (5.5) and (5.6). First consider 
4 Since Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) is a perfect information game, the deviation will be detected immediately.
i.e., up to the multiplicative constant γ T1−1 , the sum in (5.7) is the payoff to P 1 in Γ 
Combining (5.5)-(5.9) we have:
and we have proved (5.3), which is (5.2) for n = 1. The proof for the cases n = 2 and n = 3 is similar and hence omitted.
We have seen that every Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has at least two deterministic NE (one in positional strategies and another in non-positional ones); and in fact, as is well known, a stochastic game may possess any number of NE. On the other hand, we only know how to compute a single NE of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ), namely the non-positional one of Theorem 5.2, which is constructed in terms of the two-player strategies of Γ n 3 (G|s 0 ). One may be tempted to construct additional NE of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) using the optimal strategies of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ). For example, one may reason as follows: P 3 's best chance to avoid capture in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) is by ignoring P 1 and playing his best (in Γ 2 (G|s 0 )) evasion strategy against P 2 . By a similar reasoning for the other players, one may conclude that,
2 is a NE of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) played between P 1 and P 2 , and (ii) σ 2 , σ 3 is a NE of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) played between P 2 and P 3 .
6 But this conclusion is wrong, as shown by the following example. figure ( for the time being suppose P 1 is not on the graph). P 3 is the evader and his best strategy is to move towards vertex 10, postponing capture as long as possible; P 2 is the pursuer and his best strategy is to always move toward P 3 . Now consider Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) with s 0 = (1, 12, 2, 3). In this game, P 3 's best strategy is to first move into vertex 1 and afterwards always keep P 1 between himself and P 2 ; he can always achieve this and thus avoid capture ad infinitum. And P 2 's best strategy is to stay at vertex 12, keeping away from P 1 for as long as possible. So in this example P 2 and P 3 's optimal Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) strategies are not good (and certainly not in NE) in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ). 5 We define ρ 1 such that, when combined with s T 1 −1 , φ 2 1 , φ 3 1 , will produce the same history s T 1 s T 1 +1 s T 1 +2 ... as σ 1 . Note that ρ 1 will in general depend (in an indirect way) on s 0 s 1 ... s T 1 −2 .
6 A clarification is needed here: the domain of Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) (positional) strategies is V × V × {1, 2}, while the the domain of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) (positional) strategies is V × V × V × {1, 2}. However we can "extend" a Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) strategy to use it in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ). For example, suppose σ 1 x 1 , x 2 is a P 1 strategy in Γ 2 (G|s 0 ); then it can also be extended to a Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) strategy σ 1 x 1 , x 2 , x 3 by letting
In other words, P 1 applies σ 1 in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) by ignoring P 3 's position. We will often use this and similar constructions in what follows, without further comment; and we will denote the Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) and Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) strategies by the same symbol, e.g., σ n . Figure 1 : A case in which the CR optimal strategies do not achieve NE in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ).
Capturability
In Section 4 we have presented a connection between the cop number of G and "capturability" in Γ 2 (G|s 0 ); this was described by (4.2) which can be equivalently rewritten as
The analog of (5.10) in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) would be:
As will be seen, (5.11) is not true. But connections between cop number and capturability exist, as will be established in the remainder of this section. To this end, we first define the capture function K 3 (G|s 0 , σ).
Definition 5.4
For the game Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) played with strategies σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , we write
Roughly, K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) tells us which player (if any) achieves a capture in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) played with σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 :
(and avoids being captured by P 1 ).
A weaker version of (5.11) is:
(∀s 0 there exists a capturing NE σ of Γ 3 (G|s 0 )) ⇒ c (G) = 1 and this can be rewritten and proved in terms of K 3 (G|s 0 , σ), as follows.
Theorem 5.5
The following holds for every G:
Proof. To prove the theorem we will assume (∀s 0 there exists a NE σ of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) : K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) > 0) and c (G) > 1 (5.13) and reach a contradiction. To this end choose s 0 = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , 1 as follows.
1. Take arbitrary x 1 .
2. Take some x 2 such that for s Now let σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 be a capturing NE of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) and consider the following cases.
1. K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) = 1; then, for some T 1 we will have
Because, when P 1 and P 2 play σ 1 and σ 2 , respectively, P 2 will always escape P 1 (since P 3 can never influence P 2 moves). And furthermore, P 2 may in fact capture P 3 , since σ 3 is not necessarily an escaping strategy.
2. K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) = 2; then, for some T 2 we will have
Because, when P 2 and P 3 play σ 2 and σ 3 , respectively, P 3 will always escape P 2 (since P 1 can never influence P 3 moves).
Since in every case some P n can unilaterally improve Q n (s 0 , σ), σ cannot be a NE of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ). Hence for every cop-win graph G and every starting state s 0 , Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has a capturing NE. However, perhaps surprisingly, there exists cop-win graphs and starting states for which Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) also has noncapturing NE, as the following example shows.
Example 5.6 Take a path with P 1 and P 2 at the endpoints and P 3 at the middle, as shown in Figure 2 . The 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2: A graph G in which Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has a noncapturing NE.
strategy profile σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 is defined as follows.
1. σ 1 : P 1 stays in place as long as P 2 does not move; if P 2 moves, P 1 chases him.
2. σ 2 : P 2 stays in place as long as P 3 does not move; if P 3 moves, P 2 chases him.
3. σ 3 : P 3 stays in place as long as nobody moves; if P 1 moves, P 3 goes towards P 2 ; if P 2 moves, P 3 goes towards P 1 .
We will now show σ is a noncapturing NE of Γ (G|s 0 ). Obviously we have ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} :
We will show no player profits by unilaterally changing his strategy.
1. Say P 1 uses any strategy σ 1 . If, by σ 1 , he moves at some time, then P 3 goes towards P 2 and P 2 goes towards P 3 resulting in a capture of P 3 by P 2 . Hence
(5.14)
2. Say P 2 uses any strategy σ 2 . If, by σ 2 , he moves at some time, then P 3 goes towards P 1 and P 1 goes towards P 2 resulting in a capture of P 2 by P 1 . Hence
3. Say P 3 uses any strategy σ 3 . If, by σ 3 , he moves at some time, then P 2 goes towards P 3 and then P 1 goes towards P 2 . Depending on P 3 's moves we may have a capture of P 2 by P 1 or of P 3 by P 2 . In either case
Combining (5.14)-(5.16) we get ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} , ∀σ n :
which shows that σ is a noncapturing NE of Γ (G|s 0 ). The above example shows that the converse of Theorem 5.5 does not hold, i.e., there exist cop-win graphs G and initial states s 0 such that Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) has noncapturing NE. However we can prove a weaker result: the converse does hold when G is a tree.
The first step in our proof is to revisit the two-player game Γ 2 3 (G|s 0 ) of Section 5.1. Recall that it is played between P 2 and P −2 who controls the tokens P 1 and P 3 . We now prove the following.
Proof. Let us choose some initial state s 0 and some optimal (in Γ 2 3 (G|s 0 )) profile σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , and keep them fixed for the rest of the proof.
For any σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , the capture function K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) will take a value in {0, 1, 2}. The values correspond to three outcomes in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) and the same outcomes are obtained in Γ 2 3 (G|s 0 ) (the two games differ in their payoffs but are played by the same rules):
2. K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) = 2 means P 2 captures P 3 (and is not captured by P 1 ); 3. K 3 (G|s 0 , σ) = 0 means neither P 2 nor P 3 is captured.
So we will consider the three mutually exclusive cases separately.
Let us examine each player's payoff.
And for all σ 1 , σ 3 such that K 3 G|s 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 = 1 we have
Hence
2. For all σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 we have
combining with optimality in Γ 2 3 (G|s 0 ) we get
3. And finally , then: P 1 moves towards P 2 , P 2 moves away from P 1 and P 3 stays in place; eventually P 2 is captured. , then: P 1 moves towards P 2 , P 2 moves towards P 3 and P 3 moves away from P 2 ; eventually P 3 is captured. , then: P 1 moves towards P 2 , P 2 moves away from P 1 and P 3 moves away from P 2 ; eventually P 2 is captured.
If x
In every case σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 is capturing and optimal. Since σ is capturing, the same holds for every optimal profile σ, because they all yield the same payoff.
The above defined σ will be called path strategies and will be used to prove the following lemma, needed to extend Theorem 5.9 to trees. 
(c) Figure 3 : Possible placements of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 in the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Proof. A rough description of σ is quite simple: each player tries to reach the median as fast as possible; as soon as this happens the players are collinear and they start playing their path strategies. We next give a (straightforward but rather tedious) rigorous proof. In what follows, we denote the median of
For Part 1 of the theorem, we distinguish two cases. Case A. Suppose that at some time t the game state is x 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 prescribes that every player moves directly towards the median m t . As a result, let t 0 denote the first time when a (single) player P n is at distance 1 from m t , as depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (in the figures we only show the subtree of G which is defined by the positions of P 1 , P 2 and P 3 ; dotted lines indicate paths of length one or more). We will now define σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 depending on which P n first reaches m t ; when some move is not specified, the respective strategy can be defined arbitrarily.
1. Suppose P n = P 1 , i.e. at t 0 we have d x 1 t0 , m t0 = 1, as shown in Fig. 3 .a. P 3 stays in place at t 0 + 2, P 1 enters m t at t 0 + 3 and the players become collinear. Now every player starts using his path strategy. It is easy to check that this results in capture of P 2 .
2. Suppose P n = P 2 , i.e., at t 0 we have d x 2 t0 , m t0 = 1. Now we must distinguish two sub-cases.
(a) Say d x 1 t0 , m t0 = 2, as in Fig. 3 .b. P 3 stays in place at t 0 + 1 and t 0 + 4, P 1 moves to a at t 0 + 2 and to m t at t 0 + 5, when the players become collinear and start playing their path strategies; eventually P 2 is captured. Fig. 3 .c. P 2 enters m t at time t 0 + 3, the players become collinear and start playing their path strategies; eventually P 3 is captured.
3. Suppose P n = P 3 , i.e. at t 0 we have d x 3 t0 , m t0 = 1. Now we must distinguish four sub-cases. In Section 5 we have shown (Theorem 5.12) that, when G is a tree, for every s 0 there exists a capturing NE of Γ 3 (G|s 0 ); the proof depended on Theorem 5.7 which, as seen, does not generalize for N ≥ 4. Hence we have not been able to generalize Theorem 5.12 either. On the other hand, we have not found a counterexample (i.e., a tree and some initial state for which no capturing NE exists) hence the matter remains open.
The following generalizes Theorem 5.13 and is proved very similarly. 
More Multi-player Pursuit Games
In Section 2 we have developed a framework which we have used in Sections 4, 5 and 6 to study the game Γ N (G|s 0 ), for various N values. As we will now explain, this framework applies to a wider family of graph pursuit games. We have in mind games played by players P 1 , P 2 , ..., P N who take turns in moving tokens along the edges of a graph. For the time being assume that each player controls one token and has, in general, two goals: (i) to capture some (other players') tokens and (ii) to avoid capture of his own token.
Any such situation can be described, by the formulation of Section 2, as a multi-player discounted stochastic game of perfect information. Assuming, without loss of generality, that the players move in the sequence implied by their numbering, the actual "capture relationship" will be encoded by the turn payoff functions q n . To preserve the semantics of pursuit / evasion, they should have the form
n is the set of P n 's "targets" (i.e., the players whom he can capture) and 2. B n is the set of P n 's "pursuers" (i.e., the players who can capture him).
For example, in in Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) we have players P 1 and P 2 with respective sets
while in Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) we have players P 1 , P 2 and P 3 with respective sets
and the additional condition of no simultaneous captures (which, as, requires a small modification of (7.1)). As a final example, consider a game which we could call "Cyclic Cops and Robbers"; it involves players P 1 , P 2 and P 3 in which: P 1 chases P 2 and avoids P 3 ; P 2 chases P 3 and avoids P 1 ; P 3 chases P 1 and avoids P 2 . In this game we will have This game has some interesting properties; they will be fully described in a separate publication, but as an example suppose it is played on the star graph of Figure 6 , with initial positions as indicated. It is easily checked that, even though the star graph is cop-win, the game has only noncapturing NE. Many similar games can be constructed along these lines and all of them will (i) fall within the game-theoretic framework of Section 2 and (ii) possess a well defined game theoretic solution, namely a NE in deterministic positional strategies, according to Theorem 3.1.
In fact the framework of Section 2 can accommodate further generalizations for which Theorem 3.1 will still hold. We list some additional generalizations to the idea of graph pursuit game.
1. Payoffs. The turn payoffs q n can take values in [−1, 1] rather than {−1, 1}. As an example, we have introduced and studied the game of Selfish Cops and Robbers [12] , in which two cops pursue a robber but do not split the capture payoff equally; instead the capturing (resp. noncapturing) cop receives payoff (1 − ε) (resp. ε), where ε ∈ 0, 1 2 . Hence each cop has a motive to be the one who actually captures the robber; if this "selfishness" is sufficiently strong (this will depend on the ε value) it can be exploited by the robber to avoid capture ad infinitum.
2.
Teams. So far we have assumed that each player controls a single token. But we can also assume that a game is played by N players (with N ≥ 2) with P n controlling K n tokens. An example of this is the classic CR game with more than one cop tokens (all of them controlled by a single cop player ). Another example are the Γ n N (G|s 0 ) auxiliary games of Sections 5.1 and 6. These are two-player games, but the idea can be applied to multi-player games as well. For example we could have the three-player GCR game with P 1 controlling two pursuer tokens and each of P 2 and P 3 controlling one pursuer and one evader token.
3. Game termination. So far we have assumed that the game terminates upon the first capture, but this can also be modified. For example the game could end upon the elimination of all tokens of one player, or when no more captures are possible.
Since all of the above modifications can be accommodated by the formulation of Section 2, the respective games can be analyzed by game-theoretic methods. At the very least, by Theorem 3.1 they all possess NE; further results can be obtained by exploiting the special characteristics of each game.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced and studied the Generalized Cops and Robbers game Γ N (G|s 0 ), a multi-player pursuit game in graphs. The two-player version Γ 2 (G|s 0 ) is essentially equivalent to the classic CR game. The three-player version Γ 3 (G|s 0 ) can be understood as two CR games played simultaneously on the same graph; a player can simultaneously be pursuer and evader. This also holds for Γ N (G|s 0 ) when N ≥ 4.
Using a formulation of Γ N (G|s 0 ) as a discounted stochastic game of perfect information we have proved that it has at least one NE in positional deterministic strategies. Using auxiliary two-player games Γ n N (G|s 0 ) we have 7 The conditions in (7.1) encode "minimum" requirements, additional restrictions may be imposed, e.g., no simultaneous captures. also proved the existence of an additional NE in nonpositional deterministic strategies. We have also studied the capturing properties of the Γ N (G|s 0 ) NE in connection to the cop-number c (G).
Both Γ N (G|s 0 ) and Γ n N (G|s 0 ) are members of a general family of graph pursuit games, which can be described by the framework of Section 2 and its generalizations, presented in Section 7. This family is a broad generalization of the two-player graph pursuit games previously studied to the multi-player case; it contains games with rather unexpected properties and hence, we believe, it deserves additional study.
